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Abstract
THOU SHALT NOT KILL?
by Steve T. Pawluk
Very little has been said about the homicide law of the Decalogue.
Upon reading the sixth commandment, it is often assumed that the prohibition
of killing is absolute.

If this is so, then serious problems are raised,

not only for an act of killing itself, but also for things like self-defense,
punishment by death, abortion, and suicide.
It is the purpose of this paper to deal in the following manner with
the issue of killing:

The first task is to begin with the obvious starting

point, the sixth commandment itself.

After noting the language used, as

well as Hebrew expressions not used, presumably on purpose, it will be seen
that the prohibition of killing applies only to the shedding of the innocent
blood of a human being within the covenant community.
The second chapter will explore an additional aspect of killing,
that is, abortion.

There is some discussion as to whether or not Moses

directly addressed the issue and if, in fact, abortion is considered to be
the taking of innocent life.

It is the position of this paper that abortion

is not, according to Mosaic law, an act of murder.
The third chapter, in an attempt to deal with the question of
suicide, will have to go outside of the Pentateuch for evidence since Moses
is silent on this point.

Indeed, information in the entire Old Testament

is scant and it appears that no completely satisfactory answer can be
provided.

Chapter four will examine several cases in which the lawcode is
applied, and then the paper will summarize the conclusions reached.
The conclusions of this paper are that (1) all life is from
God and belongs to him, (2) the shedding of the innocent blood of a
covenant community member is illegal, (3) other types of killing, such
as vengence or punishment, rather than going contrary to the lawcode,
are required by it, (4) the killing of a non-human or a non-covenant
community member was accepted as sometimes being necessary and thus
carried out with prudence.
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Introduction
Attempts to solve problems by violent means appear to have begun
quite early on in the history of human existence.

As early as the story

of Cain and Abel, recorded in the fourth chapter of Genesis, one individual
has hilled another for personal reasons such as envy, anger, or an inability
I

to solve an argument in any other manner. At the same time, almost every
society has some kind of taboo against murder and/or violence.

The taking

of innocent life is prohibited or at least looked down upon in either the
written codes of a society, such as the Pentateuch) Laws of Hamurabbi
Litit-Ishtar, Eshnurma; or in an implied code such as that of the Early
Americans prior to European settlement,

it is to understand the reasoning

behind the prohibition of killing in Biblical times that this paper is
written.

Its task is to explore several questions: (l) What does the

commandment, in the Decalogue, against killing mean;' (2) What is the
early Hebrew understanding of capital punishment? (3) What is the Pen
tateuch's view concerning self-defense? (4) What does Hebrew law say
about abortion and suicide? (5) Is there a difference in the Pentateuch
between stated law and applied law?
It will be demonstrated that the Pentateuch distinguishes between
several modes of homicide, only one of which falls under the intent oi
its prohibition in the sixth commandment.

The Mosaic Law differentiates

between war, self—defense, punishment—death, and, the taking of innocent life.
Only the latter is prohibited.
The topic of war, since it is of a large and complex nature, will
be discussed only briefly in this paper as a point of application in ref
ill

erence to the sixth commandment.

We will focus upon the taking of life

on a personal level; that is, between individuals as opposed to violence
between tribes or countries and as distinct from the slaying of animals.
This killing of individuals is seen by the Pentateuch as sometimes being
negative and it is thus prohibited.

Elsewhere, such killing is perceived

to be necessary and is hence commanded.

iv
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»Lo' Tirsah" - Do Not Kill
The sixth commandment, which prohibits hilling, has been the cause
for some question.

English translations of the Bible leave the reader

unclear in his or her thinking as to what exactly is included in that law.1
Does the term which is translated "to kill" apply to the taking of any life
under all circumstances?

Will the follower of the Old Testament teachings

avoid slaying any living creature, whether it be human or animal, .friend or
foe?

Does the law of Exodus 20:13 apply only to a specific type of killing

at certain times?

Is capital punishment and war forbidden?

Will the Bible

believer refuse to kill in defense of himself, his family, his community,
or his country, on the basis of the sixth commandment?

These are questions

which are raised by the English translation of the law, and an accurate
answer can be developed only when certain linguistic and historical factors
are taken into consideration.
Not only is the modern Bible reader once removed from the meaning
of the original commandment because of the differences of language, but
the student of the Law is also hampered by the fact that he lives in a
different context of thought and time than was in existence during the
writing of Exodus.^

If one were to take the English translation of the

Scriptures at face value, that reader would most likely conclude that The
sixth commandment forbids the taking of life under all circumstances.
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However, this leaves some glaring historical and logical incongruities.
What is meant by "Thou shalt not killf®'

1

2

Terminology
There are several verbs used in the books of Moses which are
translated "to kill." Among these are KTH harag, VVl! halal, $*"}jSQi.
muth,

noi nakah, hi? katal, and n>i rasah.

There are three others,

but they apply only to the slaughter of animals. ^

Three of the above terms

appear to be general in their description of the type of, or reason tor,
killing. The.: verbs halal, muth, and nakah tend to emphasize the method
of killing rather than the motive or intention of the one committing the
act.'' Harag, katal, and rasah, however, ahe translated, at least some
of the time in their Old Testament usage, by the word "murder" that is, a
wf 11fnl taking of human life by one's own initiative for personal reasons.
It is significant that one of these three is used in the sixth commandment.
Harag is the most divergent in meaning of the three words in that
it can be rendered as "to slay, murder, legally execute,' and can apply
to the slaughtering of animals as well.

It does seem to be used according

to a pattern however, in that, in all but one instance, it denotes the
killing of a person by one who is not a member of the same community.
Abraham is afraid that he will be killed on account of Sarah by the Egyptians
(Gn 12:12), Esau wishes to murder his estranged runaway brother Jacob
(Gn 27:42), the Israelites are to destroy those who have severed themselves
from the covenant community (Lv 20:16; Nm 31:17-19; Dt 13:9), and Baalam
is intent upon slaughtering his donkey (Nm 22:29). Each event is one that
occurs between members of two different groups.

Harag applies to killings

for many reasons, but these are the deaths of those not related to the

3

slayer's family or tribe.
Katal is used three times in its verbal form in the Old Test
ament, and all three instances are in the Kal imperfect tense.
in which it is so found are Job 13:15; 24:14; and Ps 139:19.

The texts
The

usage of the word in Job 13:15 and Ps 139:19 denotes a slaying by an
authority figure, in this case, God.
the book of Daniel.

Katal is used in a like manner in

The only exception to this usage is found in Job

24:14 where the verb is properly translated, according to context, as
"to murder."

It is interesting to notice however, that katal in this sen

tence is qualified by the participial form of rasah,

"the murdering one."

Having said this, it may be significant to note that the command
ment in Ex 20:13 uses the verb rasah

and not the others.

John Yoder, in his exegesis of rasah, suggests that this was
a term used primarily for unintentional homicide and, in one particular
case, for an act of murder as well as its punishment, i.e. the death
penalty."
Gerhard von Rad, in a more precise explanation of the meaning
of rasah, states that it should not be translated strictly as "to kill,"
nor is it properly to be applisd to killing during a war.

In addition

to this, it is, he claims, a misuse of the term to apply it to the ad
ministration of justice.

Von Rad disagrees with the translation found in

some Bibles, that of "murder," and points out that rasah is at times
used also for accidental homicide. He concludes, on this basis, that the
sixth commandment is addressing the problem of anti-social killing, but
9
does not explain what he means by that terminology.
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Brevard Childs takes the argument a bit further than that by
indicating that rasah refers to unintentional killing as well as pre
meditated murder, quoting as evidence Dt 4:41 and Js 20:3thinks that rasah,

Childs also

even though it is a relatively rare choice of words,

is an important term because of the lact that it is used instead of
harag and rnuth.1^
Stamm, that rasah

It is on this basis that he states, following J.J»
in contrast to harag and muth,

denotes "illegal

killing inimical to the community; . . . the life of the Israelite was
protected in this way from illegal impermissable violence."11

J.J. Stamm

and M.E. Andrew suggest that both harag and mu&h mean several possible
things: (l) killing one's personal enemy, murdering him, (2) killing a
political enemy in battle, (3) killing one who was punishable accord
ing to the law, and (4) death as a judgment of God.

This is contrasted

with rasah, which means the murdering of a personal enemy.

Only once

is it used to signify the act of capital punishment, and never is it
used to mean the slaying of an enemy in battle or death as a result of
God's action.^
Childs notes that rasah

is often used in connection with blood

vengeance and the avenger, thus leading to the view that the prohibition
of Ex 20:13 is intended to make illegal both intentional murder and re13
taliatory killing.
It appears, on the weight of textual evidence, that Stanm's
distinction between legal and Illegal killing cannot stand.
concludes,

As Childs

5

The verb came to designate those acts of violence against a per
son which arose from personal feelings or hatred and malice. The
command in its present form forbids an act of violence and re
jects the right of a person to take the law into his own hands
out of a feeling of personal injury.
Contextual Setting of the
Sixth Commandment
Perhaps a clearer view can be achieved when the matter is con
sidered from another angle.

In his arguments, Brevard Childs puts forth

the idea that the prohibition against killing is tied into the concept
15
of the sanctity of blood, as is first evidenced in Gn 9:6.

That same

idea is taken up by John Yoder who also sees a pattern, established in the
Hebrew community in reference to God,in several stages of restriction.
He detects a flow of thought in the law as follows:
1.

Touch not the mountian (Ex 19:13)

2.

Touch not thy neighbor's spouse, goods, house, etc.
(Ex 20:1-4-17)

3.

Touch not thy neighbor's life blood (Ex 20:13)

The pattern is an interesting one that is buttressed Dy the relation17
ship between life and blood in the mind of the Hebrew.
This attitude
or belief is suggested by the earlier words of God to Gain in Gn -4 •10
when God confronts him with the statement,
blood cries to me from the ground."

"The voice of your brother's

Presumable the blood is crying out

to God for justice, however, it could be imp].led furthermore, that the
blood belongs to God, the giver <3f life, and it is crying to him for re13
lease from the gound where it was violently placed by Cain's hand.
Moshe Greenberg has already explored this view and has derived

6

several points from it:
1.

The shedding of innocent blood always causes bloodguilt,
even when accidental (Nm 35:31-33; cf. Dt 19:10)

2.

Avenging innocently shed blood does not result in bloodguilt, because the one being killed is not innocent
(Nm 35:27)
a.

God demands the blood of all lives from anyone who
takes it (Gn 9:5)

b.

Intention, or lack of it, makes no difference. Consider
the case of an ox killing a man. No intent can be pre
sumed, because the ox is not a rational animal, yet
bloodguilt exists (Ex 21:28; cf. w. 29-32)19

The above propositions hold true even under closer scrutiny, for it be
comes evident that there are no exceptions.

The kinsman of the slain

cannot pardon or expunge the guilt of the one who did wrong, nor is he

20

allowed to make deals with the slayer, for the bloodguilt is absolute.
The one variant of the rule is that the owner of an ox which gored a
person to death is not held personally liable for the actions oi the
ox, for the keeper of the ox did not personally and wich malice commit
the slaying.

21

He is not guilty of blood, but the ox is.

As Greenberg

indicates, "Deuteronomy 19:12f has entirely replaced the right of the kins
man to dispose as he wishes of the murderer with the unconditional death
penalty.1,22

It is noteworthy that all shedding of innocent blood must

be expiated by shed blood.

At the same time, no crime against property

is ever stated in the Pentateuch as being punishable by death.

According

to Greenberg, this is unlike any other law in the ancient Near East.,
Hebrew laws were very harsh when dealing with the taking of human life,
but were rather lenient when dealing with property crimes such as theft

7

or property damage.

This is not so in the law codes of civilizations

23

that were contemporary with the Hebrews at about the time of the Exodus.
As has already been stated, and as McKeating also points out,
only in one instance in all ancient Hebrew law is money compensation for
death allowed, and that is in the case of the owner of an ox which has
taken a life.2^

The idea is further buttressed in Dt 24:16 which de

mands that the actual offender, and no one else, is to be punished, and
as has already been indicated, the only possible punishment is the death
of the criminal.

Thus, it may be concluded that the significant factor

that determines the Tightness or wrongness of the homicide lies not so
much in the reason that the killer gives for his killing, although that
is of some consequence as shall be explained later, but rather it hinges
primarily on the innocence of the blood which is shed.

The status of

the killer as guilty or innocent depends largely upon the ques tion of who
the victim is.
An example of the above statement could be found in Ex 22.2,3A householder realizes, at a time before sunrise, that there is an intruder
in the house.

Presumably the intruder expects someone to be home during the

hours of the night and thus he can be perceived as one who is willing to
kill the occupant to achieve his goals.

The law provides that the one

dwelling in the house, acting in self-defense and killing the intruder, is
not shedding innocent blood, for the housebreaker was assumed to be a
potential killer himself.

However, if the owner of the house slays the

intruder after the sun is risen, then he is declared to be guilty of murder.

8

This can be understood in two different ways.

The assumption

could be that the intruder is breaking in during the day, a time when
he could reasonably expect that the owner of the house is at work, thus
giving evidence that while he may be a robber, he is probably not a
murderer, and therefore not deserving of death.
An alternative explanation could be that Ex 22:3 refers to a
slaying motivated by revenge, where the householder discovers uhe
identity of the thief and kills him in retaliation after the sun .has
risen, that is, the next day.

This action would leave the man who was

merely robbed, guilty of shedding blood of one who is not deserving of
death>because of personal malice and hate stimulated by a property crime.
It is assumed that he ought to have reported the crime to the elders
who could have applied the law according to its requirements.
An additional factor is to be considered in the event of an
unsolved murder.

Dt 21:1-9 makes provision toy this possibility by

stating that in this situation, the following steps would have to be
taken:
1.

Elders and judges determine to which city the site of the
murder is closest.

2

Elders of that city take a heifer which has not worn a
yoke or done any work, and cut off its head in an unculti
vated valley.

3

Priests and the elders shall wash their hands over the
decapitated heifer and declare their innocence of the crime.

4.

They then ask God to clear them of bloodguilt.

9

MeKeating suggests that this ritual is not merely a sacrifice, but
rather an expiation. Since the identity of the slayer is unknown, the
elders of the town nearest to the place of the crime must, in a sense,
25
release the blood to God from the land.
This is further borne out by Nm 35:33 in which the law states
that bloodguilt pollutes the land, and the land cannot be cleansed of
the blood except by the shedding of the blood of the murderer.

In the

case of an unknown murderer, an expiatory killing of an animal must
then take place/'0
There is one category of homicide, according to the law, in which
death was not the punishment for the shedding of innocent blood.
is that of an accidental killing.

According to Nm

The case

the one that took

the life of an innocnent person by accident was to run to a city of refuge
and to remain there for an indefinite period of time which ended only at
the death of the high priest.
Moshe Greenberg explains that this is, rather than a circumven—
;#
. 2 7
tion of law, a type of expiation of guilt.
In this situation, one finds an enforced detention, a kind of
punitive exile.

The only factor that can allow the killer to leave the

city without the risk of death is the death of the high priest.

Green

berg considers this rather unusual provision to have a religious-cultic
importance.

The high priest, being a unique religious figure, and in

some ways a carrier of the sins of the people, plays a special role in
the community/'5

It is possible that his death could be seen as having

29
an expiatory value.

10

In that event, the city of refuge can he considered to he hoth
a prison and an asylum until the hloodguilt is eradicated hy the death,
or blood, of the high priest.

It is interesting to note that the very

fact that there is a city of refuge presupposes that the kinsman has a
right and a duty to pursue the killer of his relative. The elders of
the city do nothing more than to adjudicate on the plea, but the process
of law is completed as the vengeance of guilt falls on the nearest family
member.-30

If the killing is accidental, the avenger allows the killer

to find asylum in the city of refuge, which is at the same time the
slayer's prison and refuge, until the blood of the high priest expiates
him of his bloodguilt.
Conclusion
With this explanation for Ex 20:13? it can be concluded that the
sixth commandment prohibits the taking of innocent blood within trie
covenant community under any circumstances regardless of motivation.

The

commandment also prohibits killing as an act of lawless revenge, but
makes it necessary for the injured family to seel the judgment of the elders.
In no way can the law forbidding murder be xaken as a basis for an opifiion
concerning the question of war, killing as a defensive measure, or the
slaying of animals.

To make a judgment on these issues on the basis of

the sixth commandment goes beyond the wording, as well as the intent, of
the law.

The commandment speaks only to the issue of taking innocent life

or lawless revenge within the covenant community.31

Thus the lawkeeper

will see in the sixth commandment a statement of the value of human life
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as well as a reminder that it belongs, ultimately, to God.

As a result,

the follower of the law will do all that is possible to preserve life,
and will, on the other side of the issue, do all that can be done to
bring those who tahe life less seriously and shed innocent blood, to
the fullest degree of justice possible within the laws of the land.

Abortion:

The Taking of Innocent Life?

The question of taking an innocent life eventually leads to one
additional consideration, that of abortion.

There is little doubt,

if any, concerning the innocence of an unborn child.

That can be presumed.

The point of argument is hinged upon the issue as to whether or not an
unborn fetus can be considered to be a living human, for only a living
human can, in a legal sense, be murdered. Unfortunately, the Mosaic lawcode does not make a direct statement on this factor.

There is no mention

at all of voluntary abortion and only one statement concerning what appears
to be an accidental abortion.

Due to this situation, any information

that can be applied to the issue of voluntary abortion today must be gleaned
from the Old Testament law in a rather circuitous fashion.
In the latter part of the 1960s, the issue of abortion became
widely discussed.

Among those interested in the question were Jack W.

Cottrell, H. Wayne House, and Bruce Waltke.1

Bruce Waltke seems to have

2
initiated a great deal of thought by publishing two articles on the subject,
Waltke takes the view reflected by most Bible translations that Ex 21.22-25
is a text that allows abortion to be practiced today and bases that opinion
oh the belief that the wording of the law suggests that the abortion of
a fetus is not in any way to be considered the taking of an innocent life
because the unborn child is not yet considered to be a human being during
gestation.
The paragraph that, at least in part, was the cause for much
of the discussion, stated that:

12
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A second factor suggesting that abortion was permissible is that
God does not regard the fetus as a soul, no matter how far
gestation has progressed. The Law plainly exacts: "If a man
kills any human life he will be put to death" (Lev. 24-:17). But
according to Exodus 21:22-24, the destruction of a fetus is not a
capital offense. The divine law reads: "When men struggle to
gether and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and she suffers a
miscarriage but no other harm happens, he shall be fined according
as the woman's husband may exact from him. . . . But if harm
does ensue, then you shall impose soul for soul. ..." Clearly
then, in contrast to the mother, the fetus is not reckoned as a
soul." The money compensation seems to have been imposed not to
protect the fetus but rather to compensate the father for his
loss.3
Both Cottrell and House take the position that such a view of Ex 21
is a mistranslation of the text and a misunderstanding of its intent.

They

argue that the text does in actuality consider the ietus as having a value
4
equal to that of any other human being.
The key to the argument is the matter oi translation.

Most modern

translations render Ex 21:22-25 as saying that if two men are fighting and
somehow during that struggle they strike a pregnant woman so that she mis
carries, the offender, who has not murdered but who nas destroyed property,
must be fined according to a price set by the woman's husband and limited
to what the court allows.

Only if there is serious injury to the mother

does the law of lex talionis come into effect.

Thus the text seems to

imply that an unborn child is less than human, for as has already been
established, the Pentateuch demands life for life.
imposed only upon destruction of property.

Monetary fines are

This would further indicate

that the fetus, rather than being considered to be a human xn its own
right, is treated much like a possession of the father.

This would be

a situation similar to that when livestock is injured or killed and a

£ If the fetus is not truly a human being,

fine is levied as a result.

as this understanding of the text suggests, then there is not any question
of homicide and the subject should more properly be treated in a paper
concerning property crimes.
It happens however, that Cottrell and House raise some serious
questions regarding what at first reading seems to be an obvious inter
pretation.

Wayne House refers to a study by U. Cassuto in which he

demonstrates that the verb

X 1 yasa'

does not mean to miscarry or

abort, but rather that it indicates a regular birth or possibly, in some
7
cases, a premature birth, but a real birth nevertheless.
House points
out that not once in the Biblical records is the term yasa'

applied to

miscarriage, but rather it is consistently used to denote a coming or
going out of a thing.0

Support for this view can be found in Gn 25:25

where it is said that Esau yasas

(came out, was born) red.

concerning the birth of Zerah, Gn 38:28 states that he yasa
was born) first.

Likewise,
(came out,

Relying upon Brown, Driver, and Briggs, Cassuto concludes

that the consistent meaning of yasa1

9
is "to come out."
House notes that

"Most, like Waltke, take XV

'child miscarries or aborts;1 however,

as the

there seems to be no lexicographical or impelling contextual reason for
doing so."10
In addition to this, House deems it significant to note that there
is a cognate for yasa'

in the Ugaritic texts, and while there was no

example in which the term denoted a birth, it old consistently mean "to
come out."11

15

One additional factor to be considered is, according to House,
the fact that there is a seperate Hebrew word for miscarriage, that is,
sacal.
well as elsewhere.

The term is used several times in the Pentateuch as
Examples of its usage can be found in Gn 31:38 where

it is said that Laban's sheep and goats have not
young.

sacal (aborted) their

Lest it be thought that the term might apply only to livestock,

it should be noted that

sacal is used in Ex 23:26 and Ho 9:14 with

reference to women miscarrying. Furthermore, there is an additional
corroboration found in the Ugaritic texts, where the cognate verb has
13
a meaning like the Eebrew term.
Thus House concludes that Moses could have used the proper term
had he intended to mean miscarriage.

The fact that the Pentateuchal

author preferred one term over the other seems to provide a significant
argument in favor of the view that the text ox Ex 21.22-25 refers to a
regular birth and not to a miscarriage.
In his study of the problem, House found it to be further sig
nificant that the word which has been translated fetus in most Bibi.es is
the same Hebrew word that is applied to a child, son, boy, or youth.
He quotes Keil and Delitzsch who also feel that the noun

yalad

indicates that "There seems to be no distinction in Moses' mind between
14
a fetus and a normal child."
While this position may have some merit due to linguistic arguments,
it is not so strong that it can be said, as Cottrell did, quoted by
House with an additional note of his own, '"The weight of scholarly

16

opinion ... is outweighed by the test itself.'

The text then gives

no credence to abortion of the fetus but rather reveals the sanctity of
15
both adult and fetal life."

There are some other items of information

that need to be considered before a conclusion can be drawn.

Waltke sug

gests that it is important to compare this Mosaic law with other laws of
the same time period.

It is at least interesting to note that Assyrian

laws, stated in language closely parallel to that of Ex 21, explicitly
refer to a miscarriage of the fetus and clearly do not hold the unborn
l6>
child to be in any way equal to the value of a born human being.
Even Cottrell, while arguing that the fetus and a child that is
born have equal value, does concede that the Talmud, in many references
to this text, sees it as a case of abortion with the lost xetus as being
"equivalent to a property loss on the part of the father,'

17

Cottrell

indicates that this view held by the Talmud is not singular, but is a
prominant view among scholars.

Among these are John Peter Lange and

S.R. Driver, both of whom consider the incident to refer to an abortion
but with no further injury to the mother, hence, a property loss.
One aspect of the question which has not been discussed by any
of these gentlemen is the physiological aspect.

According to various

authorities in the field/19 any violence done to the mother who is carry
ing a child is most likely, if the pregnancy is terminated as a result,
to end in a miscarriage than it is to result in a premature live birth.
A child that "comes out," to use the text's terminology, prior
to seven months of pregnancy, is not yet developed to the point where
it can exist on its own.

The only possible instance of a developing

17

fetus living outside of its mother's womb, especially a fetus that is
less than seven months along in development, might be under closely
guarded hospital or laboratory conditions with the most sophisticated
equipment known today.

Needless to say, these conditions did not exist

in Biblical times, hence, for all practical purposes, any fetus that
comes out prior to seven or eight months of development will not live.
An embryo that comes out as a result of violence done to the carrying mother
after seven months of pregnancy might be able to live, but again, for
all practical purposes, only with hospital attention.

Not unless the

birth of the child were to occur exceedingly soon would the striking of
the mother be likely to end with a live birth.

In-other -words, if it is

to be assumed that the law of Ex 21 does indeed refer to a live birth,
then it must be applicable only in the cases of mothers who have been
pregnant for at least seven or eight months and who are carrying exception
ally disaster-proof children.

On the other hand, such a view of the law

of Ex 21 would automatically exclude all mothers who are less than eight
months pregnant.

Thus, one would be compelled to conclude that this is an

extremely specific commandment, indeed so specific that it xs of little
worth on a daily basis in a Hebrew community during Bible times.

In addition

to this, one would begin raising questions concerning expectant mothers who
are not protected by that specific law.

With this factor in mind, much of

the preceeding linguistic argument becomes, at best, academic: and probably
in reality, amounts to a useless discussion.
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House has said that there "seems to he no lexicographical or
impelling contextual reason" for viewing the text as one which concerns
20
itself with abortion.
As a matter of fact, he goes so far as to saythat the Old Testament does not speak at all about abortion directly be
cause there was no need. House states that,
The strong desire to maintain the family name in the Near East
may account for the rarity of abortion. Children, born and un
born, were apparently held in high esteem, especially male child
ren. Even child sacrifice, which prima facie is total disregard
for the young lives, may be seen, in view of the sacredness of the
event for the worshippers, as an offering of their very best.
The total lack of a case law on abortion or miscarriage in Israel
may be due to the concern for the family name making it unnecessary.
As"well, it may be due to a Messianic consciousness, of Messiah
coming through a Jewish woman, making abortion, or the like, totally
unthinkable, and certainly needing no raw to counteract it.-jThus, says the author, it is reasonable to conclude that the fine was
given, not as payment for a lost fetus, but oecause of either mental
or physical discomfort caused to the mother.

If bodily harm of a sig

nificant amount (eye, tooth, limb) took place against the mother or child,
then the rule of lex talionis is applied.

Both Cottrell and House con

clude that the text of Ex 21:22-25 is not a statement dealing with abortion,
but rather is a protection of the rights of both the mother and her child.
While both sides of the question present valid points that need
to be considered, it seems that the position that the fetus is an equal
human being is the weaker of the two for the following reasons:
A great deal of the argument hinges upon the information that
yasa' meant "to come out" and that there was a seperate term for mis
carriage which Moses did not chcoseto employ.

Thus, it was said to be

reasonable that Moses was referring to a live birth.

However, m the
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face of the fact that a live birth was not probable, albeit possible,
it would be prudent for the law to be worded in the most widely possibly
understood" way.

If the word miscarriage had been expressly employed, then

there would be a question, perhaps, concerning the event of a live birth.
The fact that a more ambiguous term is used allows the law to apply to
all cases, whether it be an improbable live birth or a Mscarriage.

In

either case, a harmful act has been done to the mother.

In both cases

nothing can or needs to be done about the "coming out."

If the child

lives, there is no problem.

If the child is dead, the father has lost

some property and a potential help on his land, and the fine would be in
creased accordingly.

The term "to come out" would be appropriate in

both cases.
The weight of the evidence
the term yasah'

[(1) the possiole application of

(2) Talmudic and scholarly confirmation, (3) the similar

ity of Assyrian laws, (4) the physiological aspect! seems to indicate that
the unborn fetus is just that, an unborn fetus.

It does not seem to be con

sidered a human being with human rights unless and until it is born.
Naturally, the birth of a live child would be desirable in light of
economic, and following House's thinking, Messianic considerations, never
theless, the reality of the matter is that human existence was considered
to begin at birth.
It is not the intention of this paper to intimate that abortions
should be carried out at will in modern times on the authority of this
text.

It is the position of this paper however, to suggest that this text
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does open the possibility of abortion.

The text does indicate that,

according to Old Testament thinking, the unborn fetus is not to be
considered a human being, hence an abortion is not equal to the shed
ding of innocent blood.

The wording and sense of the text indicate that

the fetus is not considered to be a living human being and while it
would seem, in the context of Biblical times, foolish to terminate a
potential life, by no means is such a termination considered to be an
act of murder.

Of course, this statement is made on the basis of a

law concerning involuntary abortion.

It does seem that, in theory at

least, a transfer can be made to be applicable to the principle concern
ing voluntary abortion.

It is true, as was indicated earlier, that the

Old Testament makes no statement concerning voluntary abortion.

Whether

the fact that the Old Testament is silent on this matter allows abortion,
is open to speculation.

The silence may be interpreted to mean that there

is no prohibition, or it may mean that such a thing was noo e-/en considered,
and thus no official statement was necessary. In a largely agricultural
society, it would seem that the second option is more likely to be true.
Thus, it remains to be decided, on an individual basis, whether or not the
principle concerning involuntary abortion can oe transferred to the issue
of voluntary abortion.

It is the position of this paper that it can be

transferred, for whether or not an abortion is voluntary, the fact remains
that the Old Testament thinkers did not consider the fetus to be a human
being.

If the fetus is not a human being, then it can not, in a legal sense,

be murdered.
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This is not to say that the factor of murder is the only one
to he considered in today's society.

In present times, while in many

instances the economic and Messianic arguments might not prove valid,
one who wishes to follow the intent of God's ways must think in the
sense of potentialities. While aborting a pregnancy may not be considered
a violation of the sixth commandment, the individual must still weigh
the factor of the potential existence of a human being.
Does it, in fact, follow that since the Scripture does not appear
to consider an accidental miscarriage as an act of shedding innocent blood,
a voluntary miscarriage is to be condoned?

While the Pentateuch is silent

on this matter, evidently due to cultural desires concerning child bearing,
it could be argued that the sixth commandment's implied statement on the
desirability of life and the subsequent need to protect it would indicate
that, at the very least, the option of abortion be not lightly taken.

It

might be concluded that an unavoidable abortion would be dealt wiuh in one
way, as a property loss, but a voluntary abortion would be considered to be
a premeditated and willful termination of a potential life. At this
point the issue becomes enormously complex and would lead away from the
intent of this paper.

The question as to a definition of life, the

significance of the quality of the potential life, the right of the parent
to make choices as to the significance of the quality of that life; all
would need to be carefully examined.
Thus the question remains an open one.

The Pentateuch treats an

unavoidable abortion less seriously than a murder.

At the same time, the
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concept of the sanctity of life as seen in the five books of Moses sug
gests that a willful and premeditated abortion be carried out only after
satisfactory answers have been formulated to these very major questions.

Suicide: Punishable by Death?
The question of suicide must also be explored when discussing the
Pentateuchal view of homicide.

It is interesting to notice that the

question of suicide has been approached in modern literature from a
psychological, a theological, and a philosophical viewpoint, but little
if anything has been written about a Scriptural view of the subject.
There appears to be one very strong reason for this.
makes no legal statement about suicide.

The Old Testament

Any statement about this sub

ject must be found outside the legal codes and in the biographies of
the Old Testament. When the subject is approached in the narratives,
it is mentioned with a matter of fact tone, with an almost casual approach,
not in any noticeable way with the shock or condemnation that has come to
be associated with the act of suicide in present -jimes.
The silence of the Pentateuch on ohis issue can oe understood m
two possible ways: (l) that suicide was not considered to be a crime, or
(2) that suicide was not only the taking of an innocent life, but also, at
the very same instant, a punishment of the criminal and thus a closed
case for which no law was necessary.
Two stories will be evaluated, both requiring information from
outside of the Pentateuch, so it will be necessary, tg some aegree, to
widen the scope of this paper in order to aquire pertinent information
regarding this subject.
One case is that of Saul in a battle against the Philistines.1
The fighting was heavy around Saul and in the fracas he was critically
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wounded.

At that point Saul asked his armor-bearer to kill him so that -

he would not have to suffer the agony of dying nor the shame of being
killed by an uncircumeised enemy.

The armor-bearer refused, undoubtably

because such an act would comprise the taking of an innocent life.

At

that moment, Saul fell upon his own sword, whereupon the armor-bearer did
likewise.

The narrative makes no judgment of the act but merely mentions
p

it 'as fact.

No mention is ever made again about the suicide of the

armor-bearer and Saul's self-inflicted death is mentioned only once in
a lament sung by David.^

No mention is made of an attitude of shock,

nor is there a voice of censure.

Instead, the event is treated as a

heroic battle attempt, and the death of Saul is, along with the death of
his son Jonathan, described as a battle death and an event of bravery.
If there is any stigma attached to suicide in the mind of David, it is
not evident.
One factor to be considered is the fact that Saul, at least as
far as he could ascertain, was already dying with no hope of healing or
recovery.

This raises some interesting questions: (l) Is the self-

inflicted death of a dying man considered to be suicide? (2) If so,
does the original cause of death carry a lesser consideration than if it
had been the sole cause of the individual's death? (3) If not, at what
point in one's existence is one clearly dying an immanent and irreversable
death and thus permitted to hasten the event?
Technically speaking, the cause of death would be the original
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wound, since it would be presumed that the individual would not, at
least in a case lite Saul's, seek to take his own life if he were not
already being caused to die.

The self-inflicted wound would thus be

the only viable way to avoid extreme pain or mental duress.

The variables

in this line of reasoning are, or course, the terms viable, only, and
extreme.

The ethical considerations would be to ask who is to make the

ultimate decision as to what constitutes only, viable, and extreme.
In the case of Saul, the issue seems to be fairly clear. Saul was dying a
sure though somewhat slow death.

He fell upon his sword, not because he

did not want to live, but in order to hasten a process that was already
in progress and irreversable. Whether his remaining lew moments can be
considered living isaquestion that does not seem to have much of an answer.
If, for the sake of argument, Saul's act is not suicide, but his
death is the result of wounds received in battle as David says in his song,
the modern applications of this story could be far-reaching.

At what

point does a terminally ill patient have the right to say that he is merely
hastening a death already in progress?

At what point can a suicide be

said to be the result of outside circumstances that in themselves caused
the death?

Is it morally right to hasten death at any time, or tor that

matter, to retard an inevitable death?
live?

At what point does one cease to

It is clear that by asking these questions one has clearly left the

issue of suicide far behind. Yet in application of Old Testament teachings
to modern times, these issues must be at least considered,

thus, to return
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to the point of this paper, if Saul did commit suicide, there is
no censure.

It seems more probable that, upon analysis, Saul's

case is not in fact

a case of suicide at all in the mind of David, but

a battle related death, caused by the enemy, and worthy of honor.
The second case is that of Samson, mentioned in Jg 16:23-31.

Samson, with the power given to him one last time by God, destroys a
Philistine temple, in an act of revenge in full accordance with the
Mosaic law code, killing about three thousand men plus women, and intention
ally killing himself as well.

Verse 30 indicates that Samson's prayer

to God included a wish for his own death, a request that God honored.
Verse 31 further informs the reader that Samson received an honorable
burial.

No mention is made of his revenge-suicide as being beyond the

scope of, or contrary to, the Pentateuchal law.

The story is written in

such a way as to suggest that not only was Samson's suicide an act of
bravery, but it was an act that was done with the help of God himself.
An interesting additional note is that even hundreds of years later,
Samson's name is listed among the heros of faith in He 11.32.
It could be argued that Samson's death was secondary to his act
of aggression on the Philistines and thus, in a sen»e, an act of war that
resulted in Samson's death.

The problem

in such a view is the prayer of

Samson asking for death, as well as the fact that God answered the prayer.
It seems that there is no other explanation than to say that Samson willingly
ended his own life with the help of God, and in this case at least, no
crime or sin was committed.
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While the information connected with these two cases does not
necessarily condone suicide as a positive method of solving insurmountable
problems, it is clear that suicide was not automatically condemned by
the Biblical authors.

To be sure, any argument based on a lack of facts

is bound to be a weak argument, yet it can be said that suicide, according
to the Biblical authors, is not automatically an act that receives con
demnation.

On the basis of the very scant evidence that does exist in the

Old Testament, it may be said that the event of suicide is portrayed as a
special situation,, contingent upon many factors, and one that must be
dealt with individually since no conclusive or blanket law or answer is
provided.

It does seem apparent, at least on the basis of i-he story 01

Samson, that there are instances in which suicide is a useful option.
While the fact that the story of Samson is the only instance in the Old
Testament of a suicide with God's aid should indicate that suicide
as an option is an extremely rare case, it also can offer the assurance
of knowing that just because one has committed suicide, he has not neces
sarily violated the eternal law of God.

Case Studies
There are three cases in the Old Testament, two of them outside
of the Pentateuch, that might lend some understanding as to how the
homicide laws were applied.
One of the most readily thought of homicides of the Old Testament
is the case of Cain and Abel."'"

After an argument between the two brothers

concerning the appropriateness of an offering to the Lord, Cain invited
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his brother Abel out into the field and killed him.

There are some

items of significance in the story that need to be considered in order to
establish motivation:
1.

Cain was very angry (vs. 5)

2.

The Lord warned Cain (vv. 6,7)

3.

a.

God informed Cain that if he did right, he would be
accepted.

b.

God warned Cain that if he did not do right, sin
was waiting to overcome him.

c.

Cain was advised to master and overcome sin.

Cain lured Abel out into the field, signifying a pre
meditated act. (vs. 8)

Thus a motive of anger and jealousy can be determined.

Any killing that

won!d follow would be clearly a violation of homicide iaw.

Even aiter

the killing, God approached Cain with the statement that Abel's blood was
crying out to be released or avenged, thus implying that the blood
that was shed was innocent

blood.

According uo the laws of the Pentateuch,

Cain ought to have been given the death penalty..
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Note however, that
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this did not occur. Instead, he received a curse, banishment, and a
promise from God that his life would be spared. So Cain went away from

3
the presence of the Lord and lived in the land of wandering."'
At first glance, it appears that the sixth commandment has been
violated by Cain and that God himself shares in the guilt of the crime by
excusing Cain rather than demanding vengence for Abel's blood.

Thus

perhaps it can be assumed that there are exceptions to the law or that God
deals less severely with murder between family members.
in his dealing with Cain is not in question.
thought is the reason for such leniency.
may not be correct.

That God was lenient

What should be given careful

The assumptions mentioned above

There are some extenuating circumstances in this

particular event that set it apart from other examples of homicide law:
1.

It is true that this story has been recorded by Moses in
such a way that it is clearly a case of unjustifiable
homicide.

2.

It must be kept in mind however, that if one is to take the
Pentateuchal narrative as a whole, at the time of this killing,
there was as yet no legal code that dealt with murder and its
punishment.

3.

According to Mosaic history, this instance is the first time
a human life was ended.

4.

Although it must remain highly speculative, the fact that
the storyteller uses the word harag instead of rasah for
this killing may be a subtile method ol. indicating to the
hearer/reader of the story that this killing is in several
ways different than subsequent killings, especially in light
of the fact tMt this is the first killing of a human being.

This act of Cain appears to be not so much a violation of a law,
especially since no law had at that time been stated, but rather an
event that compelled God to instruct the human race further concerning
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the results of sin, and the proper way of thinking of it.
been violated for one did not yet exist.

No lawcode . had

However, life had been taken

and this event forced God to inform the human race of the wrongness of
such a practice.
Until this point, it might be presumed, human beings were merely
beginning to work out the effects of sin in their lives.

An Edenic lifestyle

which God had pronounced as being good was slowly being eroded by a new
found sinfulness -

It would be unreasonable to assume that man became

immediately immoral and lived a totally depraved style of life after the
fall.

The story of Gn 1 - 10 seems to indicate a progression of sinfulness.

It is likely that man was still somewhat controlled by an "instinct" for
goodness all the time of this killing, and that Cain had to consciously
override this internal barrier.
his internal barrier to killing.

Thus God confronted Cain on the basis of
Cain's act was one that went against the

grain of his past experiences, yet one that could be adjusted to with only
a little difficulty.

Thus God must place sanctions upon killing fellow

human beirps in order to avert what could easily become a casual solution
to interpersonal problems.
Yet, since it was a first offence for the race, and as such, a
learning experience rather than open violation of law, a more lenient
punishment would be just.

On the other hand, the punishment would have

to be sufficient to make a statement concerning the evil of killing another
human being.

And so Cain was sent to wander, away from the presence of

God; a punishment as harsh as possible short of taking Cain's life.

A
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sentence that would not shortly end, for God protected Cain's life, so
that no one else would kill him and lessen the severity of the punishment.
While Cain had nothing to fear as far as a legal punishment was concerned,
the danger of retaliation because of anger was to be considered, thus God
stated that the punishment of the one who retaliates would be seven times
greater, for now God had spoken concerning the sinfulness of killing.'"'
This case then, is not in actuality a case of applied law, for
law did not at that time exist.

It is rather an introduction to the

crime and its seriousness as well as a statement of the fairness of
God in dealing with evil.

It is an event that informed the human race,

instead of carrying out the sentence for a crime.,that it was not informed
about; and thus, in this case, a punishment of death would not be fair
or reasonable,"5
This case might be compared to a case of similar leniency found
in 2 S 14.

The story relates how a widow woman approached King David

and explained to him that her only two sons had had an argument.
process, one son had killed the other.

In the

Other relatives were anxious to

fulfill the letter of the law and put the remaining son who had murdered
his brother, to death.

The woman appealed TO David for mercy on the

grounds that he was her only remaining son (vs. 7), and thus no male heir
would be left to carry

on the family name.

There also seems to be a

veiled implication that with the removal of the remaining son, the other
relatives would become heir to the woman's property and this was what
enhanced their desire for justice to be done.
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It is of interest to note that even when David told her to go
home (vs. 8) and to he assured that he would rule on the matter, the
woman suggests (vs. 9) that David is sidestepping the matter, presumably
because he does not want to share in the bloodguilt that would rest on
those who do not carry out justice.

This would explain the woman's

statement that she would be willing to accept all of the bloodguilt,
and hence David would be free to spare the life of her son.

The situation

is not one in which guilt is removed from the woman's son, but one in
which the woman is prepared to accept the guilt of allowing him to live
even though it was clearly against the law to let a murderer live.

In

this case, hypothetical though it may be, is found an illustration that
any leniency concerning a murderer brings with it additional bloodguilt
on the part of those not willing to avenge the shedding of innocent blood.'
A second illustration of applied law is recorded in I S 2/4.

King

Saul, motivated by jealousy and anger much the same as Cain, had for some
.7
time hunted David wxth the intention of killing him.
David, with his
army, which was about one fifth the size of the army with which Saul was
pursuing him, hid in a cave in En-gedi.8

Up to this point, David's army

had been at a considerable disadvantage because of the lessex number of
troops that they had.

The advantage changed when Saul entered the very

cave in which David and his men were hiding.

Saul was alone and had gone

in to relieve himself, hardly a fighting position.

The men of David

suggested that advantage be taken of the situation and that David kill
Saul and end the pursuit.

It was reasoned that the Ix>rd.had given Saul

33

g
into their hands, a view that Saul later stated himself.

On the basis of

the words of the king himself, X. . . you did not kill me when the Lord
put me into your hands. For if a man finds his enemy, will he let him
go away safe?" (w. 17,18), a killing in this event would have been
justifiable on two counts:

that of self-defense,* and that of killing

an enemy, one who by his own admission had put himself outside of the
protection provided by the law which stated "lo' tirsah.

Had David

killed Saul at that time, he would have been in full accord with the
letter of the law. However, David, presumably in an attempt to show his
total justice, went beyond the statement of the lawcodes and fulfilled
its intent by dealing with the situation in an alternate manner that
placed a high premium on all life, even life that legally could be ter
minated.

David was under no obligation to kill Saul, for the king had

not yet shed" the lifeblood of David nor anyone in his family for whom
David would have to seek vengence.

David had the right to kill Saul

for Saul had endangered his life and was acting as his enemy.

David,

opting within the intent of the sixth commandment, stopped Saul s ..lasii
behavior and at the same time did so without violence to life.
This case illustrates that while the lawcode at times gives
the ri«ht to kill, as discussed in chapter one, there may be situations
in which a solution can be arrived at without the termination of life.
Hence, the law was applisd with the added aspect of reasonableness#

It

was not necessary to kill Saul in order to spare his own life. David
would prefer to stop the hunt, but at the same time, let God deal with

the one who was annointed and set apart to Him."1'"'"

It was allowed by law,

but not necessarily reasonable, considering the value of a human life,
to kill.

The intent of the sixth commandment is to place value on life

and to minimize unnecessary killing.
A third illustrative case is that of the violent death of Ishbosheth.12

The story states that Ish-bosheth;the son of Saul,whose, life

had recently ended; was at home taking his customary noonday rest.

Two

of his captains, Baanah and Rechab, evidently with the motivation of
gaining favor with the new king, slipped into the room of Ish-bosheth
and killed and beheaded him while he was sleeping.

Taking his head as

a trophy and proof to king David, with hopes that their courage and
wisdom in joining the new ruler would be rewarded, they approached David
at Hebron.

In this situation, since innocent blood had been shed, the

law would require the death of the murderers. David would not have the
option of solving the problem in any other way for the law demanded the
death of the murderers in order to release the innocent man's blood to
God.

It is useful to note David's pronouncement of justice.

He states,

"... when wicked men have slain a righteous man in his own house upon
his bed, shall I not now require his blood at your hand, and destroy you
from the earth?" (vs.11). Ish-bosheth had been guilty of no crime
worthy of the death penalty, and in that sen^e, he was legally right
eous, Rechab and Baanah, in killing him had shed innocent blood, an
act which required, with no room for any other option, that they be put
to death.

David, in contrast to the earlier case where an option had
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been available, carried out the law as king and killed them, thus releas
ing Ish-bosheth1s blood to God and fulfilling the law.

Both the letter

of the law and the intent of placing a high value on innocent life had
been acted upon.
From both, the legal theories set forth in earlier chapters

and

the cases discussed in this chapter, several conclusions can be drawn:
It is evident that all.life, because it is caused by God, ultimately
belongs to God and an account for it is required by God.

As a result

of this, needless slaying or the taking of innocent life is made illegal,
for it is taking lightly the gift that God has given the human race.
However, a law without a punishment is not in fact a law but rather
becomes an idealistic dream.

Thus when life is disregarded and in

nocent blood is shed, the life of the murderer is terminated in order
to stop him or her from further carrying out such a light regard for
life. Furthermore, the termination of a murderer makes a significant
statement to the community concerning the heineousness of the crime
of murder.
Other types of killing, such as self-defense or the death
that comes with war were not punishable, but were, at leant under ideal
conditions, carried out with reasonableness and prudence.
The issue of self-defense, whether it be on the individual level
or on the national level, raise the question of the appropriateness of
protecting one life by terminating, at least potentially, another life.
While war is a topic that deserves separate consideration in another
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.paper, perhaps a short statement at least would he appropriate here.
Defense of life, whether individual or corporate, falls within the
scope of the sixth commandment as has already been demonstrated in
chapter one.

The fact that life is to be protected is not an issue

that needs to be further discussed.

The necessity of terminating

another life in order to protect one's own life is a concept that
appears difficult for some to understand.

It is interesting to note

that in the understanding portrayed in the Old Testament, there was
no such hesitancy.

This can be seen in the following:

As was discussed in the first chapter, the sixth commandment
protected innocent life.

Laws and customs of ancient Israel demanded

that a murderer beput to death.

Furthermore, Ex 22:2,3 suggested that

if an individual was a threat to another's life and the threatened
person hilled the intruder, that hilling was justified as protective
of innocent life.

By being a threat to one's life, the intruder in

essence, gave up his own rights of protection for he was not tahing
seriously the injunction to place a high regard on human life.
In addition to this, it is evident from the words of David
in Ps 144:1, that he considers his ability to fight to be a gift from
God.

It is a fact that this text refers to fighting in battle, but

at this point, two things must be hept in mind: (l) God is nevertheless
given the credit for David's ability for violence, presumably defensive.
(2) The difference between individual self-defense and national defense
is not a difference of quality, but of quantity.

Defense of one's
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community or nation is merely an extension of the principle of defense
of one's own life or one's family. The question should not be one of
size, but one of cause.

Defense, whether it is the defense of one

person or several million, is still defense.

The question that might

be more properly considered when making modern application of the
Old Testament views to present situations is the question of whether
or not a particular war is a defensive or offensive war. Such a decision
is by its very nature, an individual one.

The principle of defense can

be stated, but the application of that principle remains a personal issue.13
The implications of such a study today are many and will undoubtably vary according to one's interpretations of the facts in their
cultural context.

It does seem proper to say that at the least, modern

followers of Scripture can say, without a doubt, that life has an extremely
high value in the eyes of God and that it ought to be protected as far
as possible.

It seems equally correct to say that not all killing is un

justifiable and/or imprudent.

While the New Testament admonishes us to

live within the laws set by the State, it is true that if the laws of
the State allow or require certain kinds of killing, the follower of
God would be unwise to immediately reject such a law, for it is clear
that in some cases, to guard the value of an innocent life, one must

terminate other life.

Godliness does not mean k total absence of

violence, it does require, however, a necessary type of violence, car
ried out with reasonableness and prudence*

3-8

Conclusion
What this paper has done was to analyze the sixth commandment
on a linguistic "basis, and then "broaden out to include a study of the
contextual setting of that commandment.

That law was seen to prohibit

only the killing of individuals within the covenant community.

This

was further qualified by the requirement that the person be innocent
of any crime which was punishable by bloodshed.

One who had himself

shed an innocent person's blood gave up the protection provided by the
law.

Furthermore, the sixth commandment was seen to include a strongly

implied statement concerning the sanctity of human life.
The principles found were then applied to the issues of abortion
and suicide in an attempt to gain a broader understanding of the intent
of the law.

While no definite conclusions were drawn concerning an

Old Testament stand on these issues, it was shown that even in these
circumstances a high value was placed upon human life.
The paper then applied the written law to several cases in
order to determine if the thesis stated above was actually put into
practice in Old Testament times.

It was demonstrated

uhat

the law,

both in letter and in spirit, was consistently and accurately carried
out.
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